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Remembering and Understanding
I
Abstract
Starting from the facts that not everything that is understood is
remembered, and that not everything that is remembered is understood, this
paper urges that models of language processing should be able to make a
distinction between comprehension and memory. To this end, a case is made
for a spreading activation process as being the essential ingredient of
the comprehension process. It is argued that concepts activated during
comprehension not only restrict the search set for candidate concepts to
be used in a top-down fashion, they also constitute part of an episodic
representation that can come to be part of long-term memory. The way in
which these representations atrophy is discussed, as is the way in which
their idiosyncratic components are eliminated in producing representations
in semantic memory.
Some observations on the comprehension and memory of text are made
and arguments are presented to show how intrusions and omissions in recall
can be handled. Some existing experimental data is reanalyzed in terms
of the proposed model and alternative interpretations consistent with the
model are shown to be possible.
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Remembering and Understanding Jaberwocky and Small-Talk
If a model of human cognition is really to be a model of human cogni-
tion, one of the things it ought to do is to distinguish human cognitive
capacities that are in reality distinct. Two capacities that current models
in both psychology and artificial intelligence (Al) generally fail to dis-
tinguish is the capacity to understand and the capacity to remember. The
usual theoretical strategy that existing models employ seems to be to con-
vert an input string into an underlying representation of its meaning, and
to store that representation in memory as an addition to the knowledge
base. Now this is not all wrong, but nor is it quite right. People under-
stand things they don't properly remember, small talk, for example; and
they remember things they don't properly understand, Jaberwocky being a
case in point. By failing to distinguish comprehension and memory, we may
fail to capture essential aspects of each, and the models we adduce may be
correspondingly inadequate. Accordingly, one of the major issues to be
addressed in this paper is the difference between comprehension and memory.
A second main thrust in what follows will concern the processing of
text. Traditionally, emphasis has been placed on the processing of fairly
small units such as the sentence. To be sure, some theoreticians have
considered larger structures such as paragraphs or even short stories, but
for the most part even the more ambitious attempts at dealing with larger,
structured, passages have been rather restricted in scope and have often
amounted to little more than treating them as sequences of individual
sentences. One phenomenon of human language processing that should be
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of concern to the cognitive scientist is the distortion and omission in
recall of material that was processed and understood. People are not tape
recorders, or video tape recorders. A model of language comprehension
which stores a representation of the meaning of an input and then regurgi-
tates it in toto is not a model of human language comprehension, although
it might be a model of superhuman language comprehension. Our models need
to reflect what humans actually do do, not what superhumans might do.
At least within the computer simulation community, the dominating
concept in natural language comprehension work today is the concept of a
"frame" (Minsky, 1975; Charniak, 1975; Winograd, 1975). Other researchers
have worked on related, although sometimes rather different notions such
as "scripts" (Schank & Abelson, 1975; Schank et al., 1975), and "schemata"
(Bobrow & Norman, 1975; Norman, 1975; Rumelhart, 1975; and Rumelhart &
Ortony, 1975).
Frames, or "schemata" as we shall call them, are interacting structural
representations of domains of knowledge. Their purpose is to represent
the general knowledge required to comprehend language and to provide the
bases for interpreting incoming information. The idea is that incoming
information will suggest schemata in a predominantly bottom-up fashion
until good candidates are established. While this happens, top-down pro-
cesses contribute to the further selection of schemata for subsequent pro-
cessing. An important feature of schemata is that they permit easy infer-
ences to be made about certain unstated aspects of an input. Thus, for
example, if (1) is encountered
(1) John went to get some things at the supermarket
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the "supermarket" schema will contain information about baskets, thus en-
abling the inference that John put his purchases in a basket to be made.
In linguistics this bringing to the fore of relevant selected information
has been called "foregrounding" and it is discussed at length by Chafe (1972).
There is no doubt that the general notion of schemata is a useful one.
It clearly provides a representation of knowledge which permits the collection
of pertinent relationships and concepts together, but theorists have tended
to regard schemata as a panacea, often treating them as an alternative to
other representational suggestions such as semantic networks or demons.
To some extent this latter claim is an exaggeration. Winograd (1974), for
example, suggests the possibility that such a representational system could
be combined with others to provide the necessary richness. But few seem
to have paid much attention to this kind of proposal.
It is one of the purposes of this paper to suggest that the emphasis
has been in the wrong direction. Schema-based conceptions of the organiza-
tion of memory concentrate too much on the nature of concepts in memory,
rather than on the nature of memory overall. We will argue that the best
candidate for representing the overall structure is still the semantic net-
work, and the best candidate process to operate on it is spreading activation.
In their recent modification and improvement of the Quillian (1968)
network model of semantic memory, Collins and Loftus (1975) introduce some
additional processing assumptions. The first is that when a concept is
processed activation spreads from it in a decreasing gradient; the second
is that release of activation from a concept continues at least as long
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as that concept is processed; and a third relates to decrease of activation
over time. The fourth addition is that activation from different sources
summate and that there is a threshold which determines whether or not an
intersection is found. Added to these are two additional structural features.
First, that semantic similarity plays a larger role in the organization of
the network, and second that the names of concepts, i.e. words, are stored
in a lexical network which is to some extent independently "primeable."
Suppose we change the first assumption to a "restraining" principle,
namely, that if a concept does not receive sufficient activation to exceed
its threshold, then it does not transmit activation to neighboring concepts.
Suppose further that each node is a unit name for a concept which is itself
a schema with an internal structure. We would then have two levels of
associations. The first level would be between-concept connections, a net-
work representing memory as a whole. The second level would be within-
concept connections, representing the conceptual relations inherent in
individual concepts or schemata.
The between-concept connections are those traditionally represented in
semantic networks. For example, as Collins and Loftus represent it, part
of the network might contain connections between the nodes for, say, "fire-
engine" and those for "ambulance," "car," "truck," "bus," "fire," "red,"
etc. By contrast, the within-concept connections are rather different.
Thus, for example, the schema for "fire-engine" would probably not contain
references to all the concepts related to it in the semantic network.
Rather it would be a mini-network representing general knowledge about
Remembering and Understanding
6
fire-engines. It would represent the knowledge that they were fast-moving
road vehicles, that they carried equipment and people for fire-fighting,
that they carried ladders and hoses, and that they make a great deal of
noise, etc. The within-concept, schema-based representations are thus
much more highly structured, not representing more-or-less arbitrary connec-
tions between concepts, but representing the actual relationships between
those concepts required to represent knowledge about the particular domain.
With this kind of representation, there are two distinct ways of getting
from one concept to a token representation of another. One can move between
concepts by simple association, thus, for example, getting from "fire-engine"
to "ambulance." Or one can move within a concept and get from "''fire-engine"''
to, say, "hose." In some cases, it is reasonable to suppose that one can
get to a concept by both between-concept associations and within-concept
associations, "fire-engine" to "red" might be an example.
Since schema theorists generally suppose that individual schemata
can be regarded as the nodes in a network, the suggestions above may appear
to add little to what is already a fairly standard approach. There are,
however, some important differences. One is that some of the connecting
links between concepts will be simple association links, while others are
the labeled relations that participate in a particular schema. Some, but
not all, of the labeled links are also simple associative links. But,
more important than this, is the fact that spreading activation need not
operate upon the whole network (i.e. both within and between concepts)
but in the first instance need operate only at the between-concept level.
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The use of spreading activation will provide us with a basis for dis-
tinguishing comprehension and memory, particularly if this notion is coupled
with a distinction between episodic and semantic memory.
Comprehension and Memory
In order to distinguish comprehension and memory one of the first
tools we will require is the episodic/semantic memory distinction. The
distinction between episodic and semantic memory as envisaged by Tulving
(1972) is a pretheoretical one, one to assist in theory construction. He
indicates certain characteristics that each might have: episodic memory
is autobiographical, it contains spatiotemporal information about expe-
rienced events, and it incorporates perceptual information; semantic memory
is a mental thesaurus. Episodic memory, in its representation of expe-
rienced episodes, represents these episodes in an idiosyncratic way. It
does so, as it were, in a way that is close to the way in which the stimulus
was subjectively experienced. This will become more clear as we proceed.
While a distinction between episodic and semantic memory is now fairly well
accepted in psychology, it has met with some resistance in Artificial
Intelligence (Al) circles; Schank (1975) has explicitly argued against
it.
It is now widely acknowledged that comprehension involves the utiliza-
tion of knowledge. Memory, on the other hand, involves the retrieval,
recognition, and in some cases even the regeneration of representations of
knowledge. In both comprehension and memory, the knowledge involved can
be either semantic or episodic. Suppose that when we read a sentence (or
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perceive an event), bottom-up processes initiate a spread of activation in
the semantic network. There is presumably a context in which the input is
encountered and this context will itself give rise to activation of a set
of concepts. So, the context together with the input will set up a pattern
of activation, spreading from all those nodes whose thresholds are exceeded.
The restraining principle suggested earlier, contributes to the prevention
of an indiscriminate spread to every node in the network. Given no further
input, the number of activated nodes will reach a maximum and start to
decline. The subgraph formed by that subset of nodes activated, we call
the final activated subgraph, for it represents the subgraph of the semantic
network which, in containing the greatest number of activated concepts,
represents the best final list of concepts involved in processing the input.
Each concept in the final activated subgraph has an excitation level greater
than or equal to its threshold, and each permits access to its corresponding
schema for deeper processing and inference.
The spread of activation through the network is one of the crucial
components in comprehension. It serves to restrict the size and content
of the search set for the top-down employment of schemata. It is a context-
sensitive process, since it produces a different final-activated subgraph
for the same input under different contextual conditions, and it permits
of different levels of processing (see Craik & Lockhart, 1972) insofar as
the size of the final-activated subgraph can be "artificially" varied.
Different levels of processing can also be attained by engaging in more
or less inference, which is achieved to a great extent by processing at
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the level of schemata rather than at the between-concept, semantic network,
level. Taking this approach, the process of comprehension involves activa-
ting concepts related to those of the input and the context, and engaging
in inferences based primarily on those concepts. Put this way, it becomes
clear that comprehension is a process prior to, and distinct from, the
creation of a memorial representation.
The generation of an episodic representation in memory clearly has to
take advantage of the concepts employed in the comprehension process, and in
order to do this, it would appear necessary to propose episodic representa-
tions that are rather more complex in structure than past research has been
willing to allow. In particular, this suggests a tripartite organization
of episodic representations, an organization which includes surface struc-
ture, semantic representation, and input associates. The proposal is that
an episodic representation is generated as a concept centered around the
theme or topic. The representation would include the final activated sub-
graph by including tokens of all its concepts. These tokens would allow
access between the episodic representation and knowledge in semantic memory
which is either related to the episodic representation itself, or to its
components. It would get built up in short term memory and then entered
into episodic memory as a record of the experienced meaning of the input.
Such a proposal for tripartite episodic representations has a number
of interesting features, particularly if a decay function is associated
with each component of the representation. One such feature concerns the
relationship between the surface structure and the semantic representation.
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Details of the semantic representation which were not explicit in the
surface structure are normally determined with the help of concepts in the
final activated subgraph, and this in turn depends for its particular
character on the context in which the input was encountered. Thus, if the
surface structure is temporarily stored but inadequately processed, as
might happen when one hears but doesn't "register" what someone says, a
reinterpretation based on the surface structure alone may give rise to a
slightly different episodic representation. Thus, the semantic representa-
tion, which can be thought of as an instantiated schema, may have different
values for some of the variables whose values were inferred.
Whereas it can happen that occasionally a representation of surface
structure survives without the other two parts which constitute an episodic
representation, normally the situation is the other way round. That is,
the decay functions associated with each level of representation are such
that the surface structure is lost first, the semantic representation second,
and the final activated subgraph last. At each decaying level, the con-
stituents may themselves be decaying at different rates, so that not all
constituents of all levels are equally available at different times. Each
level, however, provides some reconstructive potential for the more
rapidly decaying level next to it. Thus, if the surface structure has
decayed the semantic representation provides the possibility of reconstruc-
ting it in whole or in part, although more often than not, this reconstruc-
tion results in a paraphrase rather than a verbatim recall. More interesting,
however, is what happens if details have been lost from the second level,
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the semantic representation. If, for example, the value assigned to a
particular variable has decayed, the bottom level provides a list of candidate
concepts for regenerating or reconstructing the semantic representation.
Later, it will transpire that this is the way in which one can account for
errors, omissions and intrusions in recall. This reconstructive potential,
however, is not perfect since the contextual details, while influencing the
final activated subgraph, are not explicitly stored in the top level of
surface structure representation. So, if one can remember a speaker's
exact words (surface structure), one can generally remember (or at least
reconstruct) how it was interpreted and, consequently, at least some of the
associated concepts. However, one may have forgotten the surface structure
and still have a representation of the semantic structure, or even lost
that but still have some associated concepts left. The associations repre-
sented by the final activated subgraph must be represented because they
are in part determined by the total context in which the input originally
occurred; this is how encoding specificity can be handled (Tulving & Thomson,
1973). Notice that so far nothing has gone into semantic memory; semantic
memory has merely been invoked in getting episodic representations
built up.
On the view being proposed, the knowledge structures stored in semantic
memory are for practical purposes relatively permanent; over time they may
undergo changes, but semantic memory is basically a repository for encyclo-
pedic knowledge. Episodic memory, on the other hand, is memory for the kind
of information one might incorporate in a personal diary (cf. Ortony, 1975).
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However, it is more than a record of personal experiences. It is also the
source of knowledge for semantic memory, provided that the necessary pro-
cessing takes place before too much of the episodic representation is lost.
The contents of episodic memory impose certain restrictions on the way
that knowledge can be represented. For the sake of simplicity, let us,
for the moment, restrict our discussion to knowledge represented proposi-
tionally.
Semantic memory represents knowledge that a person believes to be true.
While it is derived from experience, it is a record of what he knows
independently of experience. Episodic memory contains this knowledge
embedded in source and modality information but it cannot be inferred
directly from it. A simple example: I read a book that claimed that X
might be represented as part of the contents of one entry in episodic
memory. X here represents some arbitrary proposition. A normal person
satisfied that he wasn't deluded would probably easily move to A book
claimed that X, and that might or might not be entered into semantic memory
depending on the relevance of the book to what is already known. But the
putative knowledge is X, stripped of source and circumstances, and a
complicated, time-consuming process of evaluation may be required before
a person would be willing to assent to X alone. If time is available, and
relevance and potential use in inference seem to justify it, the evaluation
may be undertaken and, if X can stand alone, it may be transferred to seman-
tic memory alone. The evaluation required to get from A book claimed that X
to X is a form of inference. So, we have a situation in which the
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comprehension of an input item depends on accessing information in semantic
memory so as to enable the construction of a representation in episodic
memory. The putative knowledge in episodic memory (the X in A book claimed
that X) can subsequently be freed for semantic memory if it is sufficiently
relevant and if sufficient subjective truth can be accorded to it. These
evaluative processes, of course, need not be conscious.
A Re-interpretation of Some Data
An associative model of the kind just outlined appears to be capable
of distinguishing between comprehension effects and memory effects. Although
current fashion in cognitive psychology tends to be rather unsympathetic
towards associative models, it may be that associationism in general has
been confused with particular associative theories, or pieces of them (e.g.,
Anderson & Bower, 1973; Collins & Quillian, 1969). If this is indeed true,
then it is necessary to show that some of the experimental results often
cited as good reasons for rejecting associative accounts need to be re-
examined. The experiments I have chosen to look at are two that were con-
ducted in our own laboratory.
Ortony and Anderson (1977) constructed a number of sentence sets in
which a noun phrase, either a name or a definite description, was paired
with one of two predicates. For example, one of the sentence sets that was
used was:
(2) The inventor of dynamite had a profound effect on the nature
of warfare...
(3) Alfred Nobel had a profound effect on the nature of warfare...
(4) The inventor of dynamite wore a fine beard...
(5) Alfred Nobel wore a fine beard...
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Each subject in the experiment saw two sentences from each set. In
the example above, a subject would see either (2) and (5), or (3) and (4),
and he was then asked to write a continuation of the sentence with the word
"but." The purpose of the task was to encourage the subject to think care-
fully about the meaning of the sentence. After the subject had worked
through the list he was given a recognition task in which all the sentences
from all sentence sets were shown to him. His task was to determine for
each sentence whether it was a new sentence (one which he had not seen
earlier) or an old one (which he had). The primary purpose of the experi-
ment was to investigate the relationship between names and descriptions,
and between them and different kinds of predicates. This was done by
analyzing the recognition errors subjects made. Our prediction was that if
a subject saw a pair such as (2) and (5) he would be less likely to falsely
recognize (3) and (4) since the first, (2), is about the inventor of dynamite
and can be judged and understood irrespective of who he was, and the second,
(5), concerns the personal characteristics of a particular man. This we
felt was not true with sentences (3) and (4), where, it was felt, a subject
might have implicitly substituted, or at least have accessed, the name of
the described individual in (4), and a suitable description of the named
individual in (3). These predictions were confirmed.
One of the implications of this experiment, as with Anderson and Ortony
(1975) to be discussed shortly, is that the noun phrases in subject position
in these sentences cannot be appropriately interpreted until the predicate
that follows them has been processed. The context that the predicate supplies,
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guides and constrains the interpretation of the noun phrase. This result,
it seems, is one that can be well handled by a spreading activation model
of the kind proposed in this paper.
Assuming only that semantic memory contains, or can generate the concept
of the inventor of dynamite, when it is encountered, activation will begin to
spread to adjacent nodes, not only to inventor and dynamite, but perhaps
also to explosion, gunpowder, war, genius, scientist and so on. While this
activation is taking place the predicate begins to get processed. If the
predicate is had a profound effect on the nature of warfare, we might expect
activation from the predicate, or concepts within it, of such concepts as
war, guns, death, etc., but not of genius and scientist; the result would
be that concepts in the war domain would have their activation increased
while there would be no support for the genius, scientist concepts whose
activation levels might thus be expected to fall off. Hence the probability
of creating an activated subgraph containing war concepts would be much
higher than that of a subgraph comprising concepts about smart scientists.
But, if the second predicate is encountered, the predicate wore a fine
beard, concepts in the domain of people would be activated--concepts perhaps
including man, scientist, genius, eccentric and so on. In this case we
have activated both war concepts and people concepts and the resulting
activated subgraph is more in doubt--it might contain war concepts only,
people concepts only, or both. In any case, there will clearly be more
activation of the war concepts given the war predicate, than there will be
given the beard predicate because the latter can contribute virtually
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nothing. Whether or not the subject knows the identity of the inventor
of dynamite is not a critical question except to the extent that if he doesn't,
there is no chance that it can get activated at any stage during the compre-
hension process. If he does know it, and even if it does get activated
during the process, it doesn't make any difference unless it remains activa-
ted at the end of the process and is part of the final activated subgraph.
This brings us to the question of the strength of the association. It is
presumably the case that George Washington is much more likely to be activated
by The first President of the United States than is Christian Barnaard by
The first man to do a heart transplant. Nevertheless, which nodes fall
below threshold will also depend on the degree of connectivity in semantic
memory. Consequently The inventor of dynamite might be just as stable (i.e.,
unlikely to fall below threshold) when related to the concepts derived from
the war predicate as Alfred Nobel would be, even if Alfred Nobel were very
strongly associated with the conceptual structure deriving from the descrip-
tion. So, a network model could explain these results in terms of differing
combinations of the various activated concepts. Notice that we use the notion
of "intersection" but not of "intersection search." An "intersection" is
merely a concept activated from two or more sources. Its effect is to boost
that concept's level of activation and consequently the probability that it
exceeds threshold and thus activates concepts related to it.
Anderson and Ortony (1975) had subjects learn two sentences from each
of fourteen sentence sets. For example, one of the sentence sets used was:
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(6) Nurses are often beautiful.
(7) Nurses have to be licensed.
(8) Landscapes are often beautiful.
(9) Taverns have to be licensed.
Each subject was asked to learn two from each set; in this example, a
subject would have learned either (6) and (9), or (7) and (8). If he had
seen this latter pair, then of the two retrieval cues ACTRESS and DOCTOR,
which he later received in a memory test, DOCTOR was regarded as the close
cue and ACTRESS as the remote cue for his target sentence Nurses have to be
licensed. The landscape sentence acted as a control. What was found was
a pattern such that DOCTOR would be a superior cue for Nurses have to be
licensed, but that ACTRESS would be superior for Nurses are often beautiful.
The cues were not effective by virtue of their association with either the
subject alone or the predicate alone. Doctor was not effective by virtue
of its connection with licensing because it never elicited the control
sentence, Taverns have to be licensed, and had its effectiveness been due
to its connection with Nurse then it should have been equally good at
eliciting both of the nurse sentences. The conclusion, therefore, was that
the effectiveness of the close cue was due to its relation to a meaning
for the entire sentence, rather than any of the individual parts, alone.
These results can be accounted for in exactly the same way as for
Ortony and Anderson (1977). If both activated, Nurses and License are,
going to activate health professional and doctor with a greater probability
and to a greater degree than are nurse and beautiful, so that doctor is
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more likely to be a concept in the final activated subgraph than is actress.
Actress on the other hand, is closer to woman which is perhaps a better
candidate for final activation than doctor starting from nurse and beautiful.
A retrieval cue is no more than a stimulus which is semantically and/or
experientially related to a record of an earlier stimulus. If we could
assume that the final activated subgraph stayed in memory for some time
without losing its integrity, then all a cue would need to do would be to
reactivate or make contact with some part of the subgraph. Consider the word
ACTRESS in its relation to nurses are often beautiful. There are two
possibilities: the concept either does or does not appear in the final
activated subgraph. If it does not, we can be fairly sure that woman does
because it will have received activation from both subject and predicate.
In this case, the cue ACTRESS will activate the actress concept which in
turn will lead to activation on neighboring nodes such as woman. If the
activation of woman is sufficiently increased by actress, then the entire
subgraph could increase its overall level of activation giving rise to
subsequent retrieval of the subgraph. If the subgraph was not dense the
additional activation of woman might give only partial retrieval of that
subgraph. It is clear that the same kind of process would lead to recall
in the case where the cue was itself a concept which was in the final
activated subgraph, or where the cue was any non-linguistic input (such as
a picture) which made eventual contact through its concept(s) with a concept
in the original.
How do episodic and semantic memory combine to enable a subject using
a retrieval cue such as ACTRESS to retrieve from (episodic) memory Nurses
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are often beautiful more reliably than Nurses have to be licensed? The cue
activates the concept actress in semantic memory which in turn activates,
let us say, woman and beautiful. The subject, being told that he has to
recall the recently learned sentences, has other information available:
source and circumstance information which together with the activated con-
cepts in semantic memory, should allow access to a representation in episodic
memory produced during the acquisition stage of the experiment. The subject
then selects that representation in episodic memory with the most of his
currently activated concepts represented in it. There are several ways in
which he can go wrong. First, some of the associated concepts in the
episodic representation might have atrophied. Second, the activated concepts
may not be unique to one episodic memory representation, in which case the
subject will retrieve the correct response only some of the time. Thus,
we can account for the kinds of responses a subject might make. We can
even account for guesses and no response at all, In the first case there
could be too few of the associates in the episodic memory representation.
In the second case there could be none, due to inadequate processing at
comprehension time. In both cases no unique episodic representation would
be accessible.
Representing Text
So far we have pretty much restricted our account to the comprehension
and memory of individual sentences. But most language processing that
people do involves linguistic units of much greater length and complexity
than individual sentences. Whereas the sentence is a fairly standard unit
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of linguistic analysis, it probably does not have any particularly important
psychological status as such. With inputs sufficiently short to enable the
construction of a well-integrated final activated subgraph the entire message
is represented. On the other hand, as the unit of input becomes longer,
there would probably be a problem of maintaining activation of all the rele-
vant concepts for a sufficient length of time. If a reader does not attempt
to break such a message down into more manageable "chunks," corresponding to
smaller, better integrated subgraphs, the chances are that some of the
important concepts involved in comprehension will be lost. The construction
of several related episodic representations to help in the representation
of a complex or a long message leads to the idea that such messages will
have to be represented in higher level structures. We might consider how
this could work with the individual units combining to give a representation
of a passage of text. One possibility is through some kind of chaining
process. Such a process would allow an event-based representation of the
total meaning of the passage to be built up in episodic memory.
Each input unit (sentence or whatever) produces, as we have seen, a
final activated subgraph in semantic memory. The representation in episodic
memory incorporates tokens of, or pointers to, these activated concepts.
The meaning of the entire passage would be cumulatively constructed by
generating connected episodic representations of psychologically discrete
components. Each unit that is processed produces a pattern of activation
which is in part determined by the pattern resulting from the last processed
unit. If there is a dramatic change of subject, it is to be expected that
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the existing pattern of activation will not produce many intersections so
that recently activated nodes will rapidly lose their activation while a
new set becomes activated. A further feature is that the final activated
subgraph critically depends on each constituent (and its order) which went
into its making. At the same time it need contain no distinguishable
representation of each of those constituents. It has been built up through
an interaction between the input and the effect of the context (including
previously processed input) on semantic memory. It at once contains more
and less than the original passage, a desirable feature since at an anecdotal
level, at least, it accords with our daily experiences in reading text.
At the same time, the semantic structure part of the representation will
grow when the topic is the same, but will not provide suitable points of
attachment for radically new material.
In reading a passage, the reader picks up clues as to the structure of
the input from his knowledge of syntax aided by the punctuation. In lis-
tening, these clues are provided by prosodic features of the utterance.
Without such clues, a language processor has no basis for chunking the input
into psychologically discrete units for processing. We can assume, there-
fore, that in normal circumstances, a human language processor can identify
units to be processed as units, at various levels of structure. As he reads
a passage, each unit provides a potential semantic structure into which
the next unit can be absorbed, and each unit provides a pattern of activa-
tion (or a context) for the current unit to influence. Since people do
not remember passages word for word, we have to assume that the surface
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structure of each unit is not normally stored. Further, by building onto
existing semantic representations, the overall order in which the original
units were processed may not necessarily be represented. Sometimes, when
order is important, special strategies may result in the establishment of
independent (but selected) episodic representations. Such a model, one
in which there is no distinct representation for the meaning of individual
constituent inputs outside of the larger context (in this case the passage)
in which they occur, accords well with the findings of Bransford and Franks
(1971) and Spiro (1975) which indicate that subjects do incorporate in-
coming information into a whole in such a way that meaning components can
be extracted but which makes it difficult to reliably isolate individual
inputs.
When we read a sentence what we "get out of it" is not a simple function
of the concepts whose tokens occurred in it. We get a complicated representa-
tion which may to a greater or lesser extent involve all kinds of additional
associated concepts. Yet when we think about or talk about that sentence,
we seem to be able to operate on a more condensed comprehensive representa-
tion. The same is true of the relationship that these condensed versions
bear to the representation of a larger block of text. Our more superficial,
least detailed representation of a paragraph or a novel does not contain
all the concepts which all the tokens in it activated; indeed, it does not
contain all the condensed representations of its individual units. Some-
thing new and more succinct is created. I have a reasonably good repre-
sentation of Crime and Punishment, an entire novel, but it is not a
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conglomerate of all the concepts and their associates that were activated
while reading it. My representation is too vague and skimpy for that.
I know that it was about a man (Raskolnikov) and his actions (a hatchet
job on an innocent old lady) and his subsequent emotions in dealing with
a police inspector who knew Raskolnikov had committed the crime but who
couldn't prove it.
On the model here being proposed, a novel would be represented as a
connected cluster of episodic representations, perhaps all connected to a node
for it, say, "Crime and Punishment." The number of episodic representa-
tions need not be very large, especially after a long time. These con-
stituent episodes each contain some remnants of their final activated sub-
graphs, but many of the values for particular variables within them may
have been lost (for example, the name of the inspector, or the old lady).
The overall representation of the novel also contains its own final activated
subgraph.
Both at the level of sentences, and at that of text, the kind of
episodic representations that have been proposed permit of a reasonable
account of distortions and omissions in recall. As was suggested earlier,
the levels within an episodic representation allow communication between
them. We further suggested that a rate of decay is associated with each
level, very fast for the top, surface structure level, and less fast for
the lower levels. At the lower levels we probably need to think in terms
of a differential decay rate for the individual concepts involved. If I
tell you today that my dog is sick, and two weeks later you politely inquire
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as to the health of my ailing cat, we need to be able to account for your
misconception. The structure we have attributed to episodic representa-
tions permits us to deal with this kind of phenomenon. It is necessary to
assume that the semantic structure component of the episodic representation
has in some way attrophied. In the particular example cited, we have to
assume that what has been lost is the representation of what was the
particular creature that was sick. What remains is a structure repre-
senting the information that something or other belonging to the person
who made the original utterance was sick. In recall it is therefore neces-
sary to reconstruct a representation of the original. The record (or what
remains of it) of the final activated subgraph which constitutes part of
the episodic representation provides a set of candidate concepts for
engaging in this reconstructive process. Clearly, these candidate concepts
will have to be selected, presumably on the basis of inferential processes.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to speculate as to how these processes
operate. The main purpose of introducing the issue is to suggest a way of
accounting for intrusions in recall. The utilization of a decaying repre-
sentation of a final activated subgraph affords the possibility of producing
recalls which utilize concepts different from, but related to, those which
appeared in the original.
Con clusion
We have seen how spreading activation operating on a semantic network
can be used to distinguish what is understood from an input from what is
remembered of it. In doing so, we have postulated frame-like entries, which
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we have called schemata as the basic units in the network. An attractive
addition would be to allow the spreading activation to also extend to
representations in episodic memory, thus allowing entire experienced events
to play the role of associates to inputs to and concepts in semantic memory.
In this way episodic representations, or at least tokens of them, would be
able to feature as associates of later ones, thereby approximating more
nearly to what we know happens to people, namely that episodic representa-
tions can relate to and be suggested by, not only general concepts (semantic
memory), but also by one another. Consequently, we compensated for the
relative informational poverty of semantic network theories while retaining
their power to selectively activate concepts related to the input taking
into account the context in which it is encountered. Concepts in memory
are not to be regarded as structureless points but as richly structured
representations. Even concepts which have been traditionally regarded as
simple, unanalyzable properties, such as those designated by color terms,
have an internal structure. Halff, Ortony, and Anderson (1976) conducted
a study investigating the word "red." One of the conclusions of the study
was that the internal representation of a concept such as red has to be a
real interval and cannot be a point, as implied by current models of seman-
tic memory,
It might seem philosophically heretical to suggest that there are no
simple, unanalyzable properties, since, traditionally, in western thought
there have been, and color terms were frequently taken as paradigmatic
examples. Yet, we lose little if we relinquish this dogma. Concepts may
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be more or less structurally complex without it being necessary that there
be some ultimate, simple (therefore presumably structureless) concepts.
Perhaps we should distinguish not between simple and complex, but between
complex and compound. The concept airplane we might say is compound in
that it incorporates other concepts; it is a compound complex concept.
The concept of red or of warm might be regarded as a complex concept, but
not a compound one. The structure of the concept might perhaps be regarded
as some kind of distribution (see Anderson, 1975). Certainly it is straining
the conventional sense of "simple" to call such concepts simple. They may
be relatively simple, they may even be unanalyzable, but certainly they are
not absolutely simple, structurally empty "things." Simple ideas may be
useful for philosophers, but are not, I suspect, for psychologists.
In spite of the bad reputation that associationism has, "pure" associa-
tionism is innocuous; indeed, in a sense it is impossible to reject for it
asserts only that ideas are related in a non-arbitrary way. To reject
such a claim is senseless and leaves one without even the basis for a
theory. However, by making certain assumptions one can in fact explain a
number of phenomena which critics of associationism have considered beyond
theddomain of associative model. It is certainly not appropriate to try
to explain all of cognition in this way. Associationism constitutes a good
model only of certain aspects of memory and understanding; but that is only
part of the story. Long-term memory comprises concepts of varying degress
of complexity, related to one another by directed associative connections
of various types. The totality of inputs to this network has various
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short term and longer term effects. The short term effects include the
excitation of a subgraph of related concepts, the long term effects include
the generation of new concepts, new connections between concepts, and changes
in associative strengths, i.e. relative accessibility between concepts.
A possible objection to such a system might be that it is too passive.
But this is not a serious problem. Firstly, in it meanings are constructed--
that is, representations in episodic memory are created by reference to
semantic memory and sometimes recreated or reconstructed for recall. It
might be objected that all the relations in semantic memory are given and
static. This is partly true, but it is not objectionable, for the detailed
structure of memory is forever changing, both with respect to content and
with respect to strengths of associative links. Further, the relationships
that are relevant between concepts will be largely determined by the con-
tribution that context makes to activation levels in semantic memory. It
might further be objected that the system is too S-R bound--that all that
happens is an inevitable result of the activation of some concept or
concepts by an input. It would then be argued that this leaves no room
for a hypothesis/test strategy in perception or comprehension. The answer
to these objections could be along the following lines. Whereas it is true
that some of what happens is a direct result of activation by an input,
it does not follow that it all is. If every concept has a threshold it
is reasonable to suppose that some are lower than others. It is indeed
the case that sometimes all that is needed is that the input activates a
concept--such activation may even arrest other processing. Bobrow and
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Norman (1975) consider the case of people so occupied with a task that they
cannot "hear" words directed to them. Yet, frequently, in these situations,
people do respond if their name is spoken, or if the word fits into the
context of their absorbing activity. Our model readily accounts for this--
one's own name is connected to a low threshold concept (of self); words
which fit the context provide additional activation to concepts already
receiving some--so less, if any, is required to reach threshold. These
cases of "perceiving without hearing" are precisely cases in which a certain
amount of passivity is entirely appropriate in an explanation. The subject
has no control over his sudden perception, it happens to him, he doesn't
do it. But, there are some things that are not so simple. People can and
do exercise some choice over what they are thinking about. Given that a
person may have certain goals, he may (rightly or wrongly) decide that he
is more likely to achieve them by concentrating on one group of concepts
rather than another. Such a choice may give rise to activation of one area
of his network rather than another. Thinking may be partly the selective
increasing of activation in semantic memory or at least the temporary
changing of thresholds. Passivity obviously is not the whole story. Con-
cepts may embody procedures or hypotheses; explorations in memory may test
them.
Inevitably, more processes would have to be specified to properly
characterize all the phenomena with which such a theory should be concerned.
Nevertheless, perhaps that old associationist theory of memory has life in
it yet. Ironically, its vagueness is at once its power and its weakness;
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its power because it can be shaped almost at will; its weakness because
unshaped or badly shaped it is vulnerable to criticism from every quarter.
But at least insofar as it seems capable of permitting a distinction between
memory and comprehension, it has much to commend it.
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